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Why the United Nations Cannot Stop Genocide 
Cooper Scherr 
 
Upon the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the United Nations 
was founded as an organization dedicated to preserving the 
postwar peace throughout the world. Ironically, the UN’s 
conception marked the beginning of a chaotic postwar era marked 
largely by brutal violence and conflict in nearly every corner of the 
globe. During this new era of violence, two genocides occurred in 
the 1990s that truly demonstrated the UN’s inability as a global 
organization to keep the peace. First, following Slobodan 
Milosevic’s rise to power in Serbia and the splintering of 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, ethnic tensions led to genocide in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1995, Bosnian Serbs—
with the support of Milosevic’s government—used genocidal 
tactics against Bosniak Muslims in their efforts to carve out 
territory for ethnic Serbs. Meanwhile, in 1994, Hutu extremists in 
Rwanda mobilized a quick, popularized campaign of genocide 
against the Tutsi minority, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans. The bloodshed in both Bosnia and 
Rwanda occurred in the presence of UN peacekeeping forces 
who—despite their mission to prevent the violation of human 
rights—proved very incapable of stopping the killings.  
In the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, it was clear that the 
United Nations, as a slow, reactionary bureaucracy, failed to 
effectively combat the genocides. The UN’s approach to the 
genocides was ineffective because of its aversion to military 
confrontation and an overall lack of organizational will to fully 
intervene. This lack of will stemmed from the reluctance of UN 
member nations to contribute to peacekeeping operations, and thus, 
the UN could not exert any influence throughout the world while 
possessing such little influence over its own members. Therefore, 
the UN served as a scapegoat as human rights violations went 
unpunished, when in reality, as a cumbersome bureaucracy with 
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little support from its sovereign member states, it was in no 
position to be defending the world from such evil. 
The futility of the United Nations’ responses to the Bosnian 
and Rwandan genocides stemmed from errors in policy and action. 
As the violence in Yugoslavia escalated in the early 1990s, the 
United Nations implemented policies that it hoped would limit the 
spread of the conflict. First, in September 1991, the UN passed 
Resolution 713, which placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavian 
territories.1 Then, in 1992, the UN stationed a peacekeeping force, 
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), in Bosnia so as to 
protect the civilian population from becoming casualties of the 
war. Finally, the UN continued to pursue a “negotiation process 
aimed at convincing the ‘warring parties’ to settle their 
differences.”2 These policies all failed to achieve the UN’s goal of 
establishing peace in the region, and if anything, allowed the Serbs 
to continue their campaign of genocide. For instance, the arms 
embargo “froze in place a gross imbalance in [Bosniak] and Serb 
military capacity” and left the Bosniaks “largely defenseless.”3 
Thus, the blockade was “naïve and destructive… provid[ing] a 
major advantage to Serbian aggressors” and “play[ing] a key role 
in undermining the Bosnian state.”4 Meanwhile, the UN 
desperately sought to appear impartial in the conflict by giving 
UNPROFOR a strict mandate to provide “only military assistance 
for humanitarian missions.”5 This mandate placed “UNPROFOR 
in the impossible position of [being] a formally neutral force 
‘protecting’… [the Bosniaks],” and clearly demonstrated the UN’s 
                                                          
1 James Mayall, The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in 
Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 66. 
2 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 259-260. 
3 Ibid., 249. 
4 T. David Curp, “Human Rights and Wrongs in Failed States: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
International Community, and the Challenges of Long-term Instability in Southeastern 
Europe,” in Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder? (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2014), 31. 
5 Mayall, The New Interventionism, 75, 72. 
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reluctance to forcefully stop Serb aggression.6 UN squeamishness 
played right into the Serbs’ hands, causing “the ‘peace process’ [to 
become] a handy stalling device” for the Serbs, and allowing them 
to appear cooperative while continuing the genocide in Bosnia.7,8  
United Nations policymaking for the situation in Rwanda 
was similarly misguided. After the Rwandan Civil War, a UN 
peacekeeping force—United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR)—was deployed to prevent the country from 
slipping back into war. UNAMIR’s rules of engagement “allowed 
[the peacekeepers] to intervene and use… deadly force to prevent 
crimes against humanity,” but upon President Habyarimana’s 
sudden death and the resulting Hutu power grab, the UN seemed to 
forget about UNAMIR’s stated rules of engagement.9 According to 
UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire, in a call to the UN offices 
in New York, his superiors informed him “that UNAMIR was not 
to fire unless fired upon—[they] were to negotiate and, above all 
else, avoid conflict.”10 This hasty retreat at the first sign of conflict 
mirrored the UN response in Bosnia, and was due in large part to 
the fact that few UN policymakers “even possessed firsthand 
experience of Rwanda.”11 “There was no room for a detailed 
understanding of the [situation in Rwanda] on the two-page 
briefing papers given to high-ranking officials” and thus, Dallaire’s 
repeated requests for more troops and permission to intervene were 
denied.12 Unlike Dallaire, UN officials in New York could not see 
how “5,000 troops could have saved 500,000 lives,” and therefore 
held UNAMIR to a strict policy of non-confrontation, which 
                                                          
6 Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions (London: 
Pluto Press, 2002), 113. 
7 Power, A Problem from Hell, 260. 
8 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav 
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 138. 
9 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda 
(New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003), 229. 
10 Ibid., 229. 
11 Michael N. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 58. 
12 Ibid., 59. 
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effectively served as a death sentence for hundreds of thousands of 
Rwandans.13 Thus, misguided UN policies in both Bosnia and 
Rwanda allowed for the proliferation of genocide. 
The United Nations’ grave policy errors were made even 
more evident through the actions—or lack thereof—of UN forces 
on the ground. Due to the UN’s preference to avoid military 
confrontations at all costs, the few steps UNPROFOR and 
UNAMIR took were “always of limited value and reactive.”14 For 
example, one UNPROFOR mission was to establish a no-fly zone 
in Bosnia, so as to limit the Serbs’ crushing military advantage 
over the Bosniaks—an advantage enhanced, ironically, by the UN-
imposed arms embargo. However, continuous Serb violations of 
the no-fly zone demonstrated UNPROFOR’s inability to carry out 
its own mission, prompting NATO to step in to enforce the 
directive; upon NATO’s intervention, Serb airpower was 
neutralized and the tide of the war changed.15 UNPROFOR 
commanders in Bosnia would also at times call for air support, 
“but whereas action could only be effective if taken within 
minutes, clearance… took 6 hours.”16 Likewise, during the siege of 
Sarajevo, Serb forces prevented UNPROFOR from securing the 
city’s airport as a means of delivering humanitarian aid to the 
city’s inhabitants. Meanwhile, French president Francois Mitterand 
highlighted UNPROFOR’s inadequacy by paying an unexpected 
visit to war-torn Sarajevo that sent a bold political statement to the 
Serbs and prompted them to relinquish control of the airport soon 
after.17 UNPROFOR’s biggest failure in Bosnia, however, was 
allowing Serb forces commanded by General Ratko Mladic to 
capture the designated safe area of Srebrenica and proceed to 
murder thousands of Bosniak men and rape Bosniak women and 
                                                          
13 Kurt Mills, International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa: Responsibility to 
Protect, Prosecute, and Palliate (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 
57. 
14 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 91. 
15 Ibid., 132. 
16 Ibid., 139. 
17 Ibid., 94. 
4
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 23 [2019], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol23/iss1/14
 125 
girls. According to Hasan Nuhanovic, a survivor of Srebrenica, 
upon Serb occupation of the city, “the Dutch [peacekeepers] just 
stood there” while the “Serb soldiers… push[ed] the men and boys 
away from their sisters, wives, [and] children.”18 In fact, the Dutch 
were so keen on avoiding conflict that they decided “to actually 
throw [the Bosniaks] out” of their base in Srebrenica.19 “[The UN 
peacekeepers] were supposed to protect [the Bosniaks] from the 
Serbs,” but instead, they pushed “about 20,000 people… outside 
the base,” abandoning them to the Serbian soldiers.20 Over the next 
few days, the peacekeepers ignored the signs of the atrocities that 
were taking place in their vicinity: gunshots coming from fields 
where the Serbs were keeping Bosniak men; countless Bosniak 
bodies; reports of the widespread raping of Bosniak women. 
Despite these signs, UNPROFOR did nothing to stop the Serbs. 
The failures of UNPROFOR in Bosnia demonstrated the UN’s 
naïveté in avoiding combat, for “Serbian leadership [would] not 
respond to reason, but only to coercion.”21 
 In Rwanda, meaningful action from Romeo Dallaire and his 
UNAMIR peacekeeping force was also lacking. UNAMIR was a 
ragtag force of around 2,500 peacekeepers—most of whom lacked 
proper equipment—that hardly resembled a capable military unit. 
Unsurprisingly, UNAMIR received a constricting mandate that 
hampered the force’s ability to operate in Rwanda both prior to and 
during the genocide. For example, Dallaire and his forces could do 
little but watch as a string of political assassinations occurred in 
early 1994 and the Interahamwe militia units began to increase 
their activity. When Dallaire finally obtained permission to 
conduct weapons searches in the region, “the restrictive terms of 
UNAMIR’s mandate, including that any such operations be done 
in cooperation with the police,” meant that “few weapons were 
                                                          
18 Hasan Nuhanovic, “Srebrenica: A Survivor’s Story,” interview by Joe Rubin, PBS 
Frontline, March 28, 2006. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 93. 
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found.”22 Once the genocide in Rwanda commenced, UNAMIR’s 
inefficacy became even further pronounced. The day after 
President Habyarimana’s death, Hutu militiamen stormed the 
compound of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana—which was 
under the protection of Belgian and Ghanaian peacekeepers—
assassinated the prime minister, and then proceeded to kill and 
mutilate the bodies of ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect 
Uwilingiyimana. The peacekeepers had not fired a single shot. Just 
as the Hutus had planned, the shocking murder of the European 
peacekeepers prompted a Belgian “cry for either expanding 
UNAMIR’s mandate or immediately pulling out” of Rwanda.23 In 
the eyes of the world, the current UNAMIR peacekeeping force 
was incapable of effectively controlling what was becoming a 
bloody hell in Rwanda. Member nations did not have the stomach 
for further UN casualties and thus, most UNAMIR forces 
withdrew from Rwanda, while the remaining peacekeepers were 
still instructed to avoid military confrontation. On their way to the 
Kigali airport, the withdrawing Belgian troops refused to protect 
thousands of Rwandans desperately pleading for help—a fitting 
portrait of the role the UN ultimately played in Rwanda.24 Thus, 
the many failures of UNPROFOR and UNAMIR in action 
reflected the overarching flaws in UN policy. 
 The passive, ineffective nature of the peacekeeping missions 
in Bosnia and Rwanda sprung from the fact that UN interventions 
lacked the full support of UN member nations. The United Nations 
is an organized political body of separate, sovereign states. It 
draws its power and influence from these member nations, yet 
possesses no concrete power over them. Thus, UN action is 
dictated by the will of its members, none of whom were 
particularly eager to commit resources or troops to potential 
interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda. According to UNAMIR 
commander Romeo Dallaire, “UN force commanders… depended 
                                                          
22 Mills, International Responses, 62. 
23 Power, A Problem from Hell, 332. 
24 Ibid., 353. 
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on the generosity of donor nations for both troops and 
equipment.”25 With most nations “peacekeepinged out,” it was no 
surprise that UNAMIR looked like a ragtag force compared to the 
“clean-shaven, well fed, and heavily armed” European 
commandoes who oversaw the hasty evacuation of expatriates 
from Rwanda.26 The nation most fatigued by UN peacekeeping 
was the United States. After decades of foreign wars and many ill-
fated interventions—Vietnam, Lebanon, and the most recent, 
Somalia—the United States was weary of its Cold War role as 
international policeman. In addition to their own foreign 
endeavors, the Americans had also contributed heavily to UN 
actions, and by 1994, “Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN 
dues and peacekeeping costs.”27 Thus, the United States “had tired 
of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for… an insatiable 
global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN appetite 
for missions.”28 It was time to share the burden of global policing 
with European nations and other UN members. However, the 
United States’ role as Cold War superpower and its history of 
interventions in the latter half of the 20th century had established 
the Americans as the face of the West. Passing the baton to Europe 
would not be so easy. Thus, the United States’ unwillingness to act 
in Bosnia and Rwanda played a key role in deterring UN action. 
Initially, Bosnia represented Europe’s chance to prove it 
could function outside the Americans’ shadow. At the outset of the 
war in Bosnia, the leading members of the UN—the United States, 
Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom— “were… not 
inclined to support firm UN action in the Balkans”—in most cases 
of UN intervention, “firm action” meant U.S. involvement.29 
Instead, “their view was that the Europeans should take the lead.”30 
                                                          
25 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 84. 
26 Power, A Problem from Hell, 353. 
27 Ibid., 341. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mayall, The New Interventionism, 65. 
30 Ibid. 
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Indeed, the Europeans “[had] a more sophisticated historical 
knowledge of the region” than the Americans, and there existed 
fears that, should the U.S. jump in, it would “pursue ahistorical 
policies that would not achieve the desired result” in Bosnia.31 
However, as the situation in Bosnia deteriorated, it became clear 
that the relatively new European Council was unable to stabilize 
the situation. Thus, all eyes turned to the United States to help 
prevent a “possible spillover effect on other countries in the 
region.”32 “The Europeans were waiting for American 
leadership… but [would not] get it for three years.”33 Haunted by 
its past interventions, the United States looked to avoid engaging 
in the conflict at all costs, and “the one-word bogey ‘Vietnam’ 
became the ubiquitous shorthand for all that could go wrong in the 
Balkans.”34 Despite the fact that “authentic intelligence analysis in 
the earliest days of the war corroborated the existence of [the 
Serbs’] genocidal plan,” the U.S. did not want to end up sending 
“thousands of body bags… [to] a new Vietnam.”35 Thus, the 
Americans did not contribute any troops to UNPROFOR. The lack 
of American troops in UNPROFOR indicated that the force was 
more of an obligatory UN response to Serb atrocities rather than a 
staunch UN commitment to stopping the genocide. 
In regard to the crisis in Rwanda, more recent history served 
to deter U.S. action and craft the tepid UN response. Less than a 
year prior to the Rwandan genocide, U.S. casualties in Somalia at 
the Battle of Mogadishu had horrified the American public and 
severely affected the United States’ will to intervene in similarly 
unstable areas. Therefore, “when the reports of the deaths of the 
ten Belgians came in, it was clear [to the Americans] that it was 
Somalia redux,” and the United States did not want to get roped in 
                                                          
31 James B. Steinberg, “History, Policymaking, and the Balkans,” in The Power of the 
Past: History and Statecraft (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 239. 
32 Ibid., 242. 
33 Power, A Problem from Hell, 325. 
34 Ibid., 284. 
35 Edina Becirevic, “Genocide in Eastern Bosnia,” in Genocide on the Drina River (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 85; Power, A Problem from Hell, 284. 
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to another Somalia.36 The Belgians wanted out of Rwanda too, and 
upon the withdrawal of the Belgian element of UNAMIR, Dallaire 
was left with the scraps of his already minimal force. In the hopes 
of avoiding a situation where the U.S. military would have to come 
to UNAMIR’s aid, the United States advocated the complete 
removal of UNAMIR from the chaotic situation in Rwanda.37 
Therefore, rather than convincing the UN to send reinforcements, 
Dallaire’s chief problem became convincing the UN to allow 
UNAMIR to stay. The Belgians’ and Americans’ responses to the 
situation in Rwanda were evidence of the fact that “for most 
countries, serving the UN’s objectives has never seemed worth 
even the smallest of risks.”38 Therefore, “it was undoubtedly 
difficult for most states to imagine sending their troops into a 
demonic space where killings were accumulating in record 
numbers.”39 Thus, the U.S. refusal to intervene in Rwanda did not 
cause the failure of the UN mission. Rather, it demonstrated just 
how unpopular UN peacekeeping missions were among member 
nations, and how reliant the UN had become on U.S. support for 
these missions. 
When the dust settled following the genocides in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, it was clear that the United Nations’ peacekeeping 
missions in both countries had resulted in failure. The noble UN 
commitments to peace and neutrality had rendered UNPROFOR 
and UNAMIR bystanders to genocide, despite their stated intent to 
bring stability and protection to the war-torn nations. Thus, the UN 
was the wrong organization/entity to lead the world in its efforts to 
curtail the violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. Having been founded 
in the aftermath of World War II, under the understanding that war 
was “the scourge of mankind, the worst of all ‘humanitarian 
catastrophes,’” the United Nations could be considered the 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 366. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 89. 
39 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 131. 
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antithesis of a martial organization.40 Indeed, this was reflected in 
the naming of the peacekeepers. As the UN would have the world 
believe, the peacekeepers were not soldiers, but rather trained 
military professionals dedicated to protecting humanity from its 
greatest evil. Sadly, the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides 
demonstrated that, at times, prevention of humanity’s greatest evil 
requires fighting fire with fire. Instead, the UN and its 
representatives—such as Brigadier General Henry Kwami 
Anyidoho, commander of the Ghanaian peacekeepers in Rwanda—
remained committed to the idea that “negotiation [was] an 
effective mechanism for resolving conflicts,” something true of 
conventional conflicts between nations, not genocide.41 It also held 
that “neutrality in a conflict situation [was] a must for the 
peacekeeping forces,” failing to recognize that war rarely—if 
ever—leaves room for neutrality, especially for an intervening 
military force.42 Thus, the UN ethos of peace and neutrality spelled 
disaster for its military endeavors. 
Years after the conclusion of the Bosnian and Rwandan 
genocides, the United Nations owned up to its shortcomings. In a 
self-critical UN report released in 1999, Secretary General Kofi 
Annan detailed the UN’s grave policy errors and lessons learned 
with regards to the fall of Srebrenica, which served as a snapshot 
for UN efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda as a whole. The report 
admitted to a “philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly 
unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia” and “criticize[d] those who 
negotiated with [Milosevic and Mladic] rather than using military 
force in the war's early stages.”43 The UN therefore “[made] clear 
the inadequacy of [its] entire approach” and “the inadequacy of a 
system that allowed political considerations to color [UN] military 
                                                          
40 Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade, 3. 
41 Henry Kwami Anyidoho, Guns Over Kigali (Woeli Publishing Services: Accra, 1997), 
124. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Barbara Crossette, “U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop ’95 Bosnia Massacre,” New York 
Times, Nov. 16, 1999. 
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decisions.”44 Moving forward, the United Nations committed itself 
to avoiding the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda by recognizing 
“that a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel, or 
murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary 
means.”45 
The UN report thus criticized strict adherence to policies of 
peace and neutrality, but in order to preclude another Bosnia or 
another Rwanda, the United Nations needed to make further 
changes to its peacekeeping approach. First off, the United Nations 
needed to garner full support for peacekeeping missions from its 
member nations. As Brigadier General Anyidoho observed, “it is 
upon strong logistics support that any mission will succeed,” and 
this held especially true in Rwanda, where “UNAMIR was 
exposed to extreme danger through a fragile logistics support.”46 
Therefore, in order to improve the chances of success for future 
peacekeeping missions, UN member nations had to contribute 
more troops and money to the cause. In addition to material 
support, the peacekeeping missions required a higher level of 
commitment from contributors. Peacekeeping was not intended to 
become a political game where UN members boosted their 
political prestige by betting on easy, low-risk missions and then 
bailed at the first sign of hardship or danger. Rather, successful 
peacekeeping required that “the military… maintain morale in the 
face of extreme danger” and “have a strong will to… attain the 
command mission despite the associated danger and difficulties.”47 
Peacekeeping missions had made a joke of the United Nations in 
the 1990s; only by bolstering the strength and commitment of 
future forces could the UN improve its international reputation. In 
conjunction with the organization’s stated commitment to 
increased use of force, UN commanders required more decision-
making power in the field. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s adherence to 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Anyidoho, Guns Over Kigali, 122. 
47 Ibid., 124-125. 
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the strict UN mandate had allowed the Serbs to continue waging a 
campaign of genocide against the Bosniaks. In Rwanda, Romeo 
Dallaire and UNAMIR had struggled to obtain permission to 
intervene, only to be shut down by UN authorities outside of 
Rwanda. Thus, many echoed the call of Brigadier General 
Anyidoho “for a review of the UN system where a civilian 
controls… the military during peacekeeping.”48 Key decisions 
during the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides had been made by UN 
authorities away from the battlefield, with little jurisdiction given 
to leaders on the ground. Thus, in order for peacekeepers to 
operate effectively in a theater of war and violence, UN military 
commanders—such as Dallaire—had to be given full “access to 
the assets [they] require[d] to accomplish [their] mission,” 
including increased autonomy in the field.49 Finally, the United 
Nations needed to stop relying on the U.S. to “[contribute] the 
lion’s share” to peacekeeping efforts.50 Given the huge U.S. 
contributions to peacekeeping and foreign interventions, the United 
Nations seemed to have morphed into the United States & Friends, 
and, as Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated in 1999, 
the weary U.S. “need[ed] the… leadership and help of [its] allies in 
Europe and… friends around the world.”51 
 Since its shortcomings in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United 
Nations has continued its peacekeeping efforts throughout the 
globe and tried to learn from its mistakes in the 1990s. The 
Bosnian and Rwandan genocides demonstrated major flaws in the 
United Nations’ approach to peacekeeping, as UN policies of 
neutrality that were designed to keep the peace instead led to UN 
inaction in the face of genocide. The inadequate UN responses in 
Bosnia and Rwanda underscored UN members’ lack of will to 
fully commit to peacekeeping and caused the UN to appear timid 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 124. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Madeleine K. Albright, Focus on the Issues: Europe (Bureau of Public Affairs: 
Washington, D.C., 1999), 65. 
51 Albright, Focus on the Issues, 61. 
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in the face of evil. While the United Nations cautiously avoided 
war—the scourge of mankind—at all costs, it allowed some of the 
greatest crimes against humanity to occur on its watch. The United 
Nations has yet to encounter another peacekeeping challenge like 
the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, but one can only hope that 
the lessons the UN learned in the 1990s will help prevent genocide 
in the future. 
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